State and the economy: a strategy for wage-led development by Onaran, Özlem
 1 
 
 
State and the economy:  
A strategy for wage-led development 
 
Özlem Onaran 
University of Greenwich 
 
 
 
 
 
Year: 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No: GPERC24 
 
 
 
 
 0 
 
Abstract: Since the 1980s there has been a clear reversal of the trends towards relatively egalitarian 
income distribution achieved during the post-war era, with a global race to the bottom in the share of 
wages in national income in the UK and elsewhere. This decline in the wage share was associated with 
a weaker and volatile growth performance. In the UK, similar to the US or the periphery of Europe, 
households increased their debt to maintain consumption levels in the absence of decent wage increases. 
The crisis of 2007-9, and the subsequent Great Recession has proven the fragility of this model. The 
recovery in Britain is built once again on the shaky ground of household debt instead of wage growth. 
Empirical evidence shows that in the vast majority of countries a fall in the wage share leads to lower 
growth; this is what we call a wage-led growth economy. The UK is a typical example of a wage-led 
economy.  In a wage-led country like the UK, or the EU as a whole, more egalitarian policies are 
consistent with growth. A wage-led recovery out of the financial crisis is feasible, but will need political 
will to achieve.  Globalisation is not an impediment to a wage-led development strategy. The UK and 
the EU as a whole would be the economies that would benefit most from a coordinated boost to the 
wage share at the global level. As such, the UK and Europe could, and should, take a step forward in 
terms of radically reversing the fall in the wage share. This would then create space for egalitarian 
growth strategies at a global level. The fall in the wage share has been a deliberate outcome of policies 
that led to the fall in the bargaining power of labour, welfare state retrenchment, and financialisation. 
The solution therefore lies in reversing this process. Policies should be in place to ensure that nominal 
wages increase in line with inflation and productivity. This should follow an initial gradual correction 
of the loss in the wage share in the past three decades.  A strategy of wage-led development requires a 
policy mix that includes labour market policies aiming at pre-distribution, as well as redistributive 
policies through progressive taxes. Furthermore, distribution policies need to be complemented by a 
macroeconomic and industrial policy mix. Wage policies have to be embedded into broader targets of 
equality, full employment, and ecological sustainability.   
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1. Introduction 
 
More than five years after the Great Recession, we have experienced not only the slowest 
recovery in the history of the UK, but also an upturn without a recovery in real wages. Real 
earnings in 2014 (deflated by the RPI) are at the same level as they were in 2000, and are still 
13.8% below their peak level of 20081. While there is some excitement that nominal wages 
have finally caught up with inflation after five years of real wage decline, in early 2014, 
earnings are still lagging behind inflation in RPI.2 The weekly earnings of typical self-
employed people, a major source of the job creation during this so-called recovery, have been 
hit far harder than those of employees, who have already experienced unprecedented falls 
(D’Arcy and Gardiner, 2014).3 . There is also no recovery for those trapped on zero-hours 
contracts. But there is one more important issue that is missing in the debate: the distribution 
of income between wages and profits. Even when nominal wages start rising faster than prices, 
if real wages (nominal wages adjusted for inflation), do not rise along with productivity (output 
per employee), the share of labour in the national income pie will contract in favour of the 
owners of capital. This is what the UK has been experiencing in the last three decades, well 
before the crisis of 2008. 
A dramatic decline in the wage share in national income has been a common trend in 
both the developed and developing world, along with neoliberal policy reforms following the 
1980s. These reforms promised to stimulate private investment and exports, which in turn were 
expected to generate higher growth, the trickle-down effects of which were believed to be the 
creation of more jobs. This has not happened. In fact the fall in the wage share is responsible 
                                                          
1 In 1987 prices (deflated by RPI index with the base year value in 1987 indexed to 100), the real weekly earnings (including 
bonuses) in January 2000 was £186.7, and they are £186.0 in 1987 prices (£474 in current prices) as of March 2014. In the 
peak of February 2008, they were £215.7 in 1987 prices. Own calculations based on ONS data available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Weekly+Earnings#tab-data-tables and 
http://ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Retail+Prices+Index#tab-data-tables. 
2 Own calculations based on ONS data as above. 
3 In 2011-12 the typical self employed person earned 40% less than the typical employed person; this is a remarkable increase 
in the gap from its level of 28% in 2006-07 (D’Arcy and Gardiner, 2014). 
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for lower and more volatile growth rates, and a crisis-prone economy in the UK and across 
most other major economies in the world (Onaran and Galanis, 2012). This is because wages 
are not just a cost but a source of demand; wage stagnation leads to lower demand, and hence 
potentially lower growth. In the UK, just as in the US, debt accumulation by working people 
has substituted the lack of wage growth, and maintained consumption in the run up to the crisis. 
Since 2007, we have seen that this was a fragile and unsustainable model. 
Capitalism needs workers and their wages as much as it needs big-business and their 
profits. If the fruits of technological change and increasing productivity are not shared by 
workers, capitalism faces demand deficiency and potentially a crisis of realisation of profits. 
Even the World Economic Forum, which represents the interests of big business, has 
been listing income inequality as the greatest global risk since 2012. Christine Lagarde, 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in her speech at the 2013 World 
Economic Forum said: “Excessive inequality is corrosive to growth; it is corrosive to society. 
I believe that the economics profession and the policy community have downplayed inequality 
for too long.” Until recently economic orthodoxy, including the IMF has purposefully 
overlooked inequality, but most of their recent concern has been focused on the very bottom 
of the wage distribution, or more recently the top of the distribution, while nothing has been 
said about the middle. The financial crisis opened up an historic window of opportunity for 
those working broadly on the causes and consequences of the fall in the share of wages in 
national income. Nevertheless, what is advocated in speeches or discussion notes (e.g. Ostry et 
al, 2014), is far from translating itself to the policy of the governments or international 
institutions such as the IMF. The aim of this paper is to illustrate why capital’s victory over 
labour has been empty4, and why inequality hampers rather than spurs growth and job creation.  
 
                                                          
4 See  Johnson (2013), who has reported the findings of Onaran and Galanis (2012) in The Financial Times  with the title 
“Capital gobbles labour’s share, but victory is empty.”  
 3 
 
2. Falling wage share, rising top income share 
 
Since the 1980s there has been a clear reversal in the trends towards relatively egalitarian 
income distribution that were achieved during the post-war era, with a global race to the bottom 
in the share of wages in GDP (Onaran and Galanis, 2012; Stockhammer, 2013; OECD 2012). 
This has been due to real wages (nominal wages after correcting for the rise in prices) 
increasing at a slower pace than productivity in most years, with even decreasing real wages in 
some instances – a process referred to as wage moderation. 
Figure 1 shows the adjusted wage share5 in the UK, the original 12 Eurozone member 
states (Eurozone-12) and the US, plotted against growth rates in GDP. There is a clear secular 
decline in the wage share in all countries starting from the late 1970s or early 1980s. The share 
of wages in UK GDP fell from 77.3% in 1975 to 68.5% in 2008. It is true that during the crisis 
productivity fell even more than real wages, and labour share increased in 2009, as it mostly 
does during recessions; however this trend is reversed in 2010-11 and then again in 2013 as 
labour share fell once again. Historically, the wage share tends to rise during recessions as 
companies hold on to workers, then falls back in a recovery. But during the Great Recession 
the labour share did the opposite: it fell soon after the initial year of the recession, and when 
the recovery began it kept falling. This has important consequences for aggregate demand and 
may partly explain why the recovery is so weak or stagnation has persisted.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
                                                          
5 Wages are adjusted labour compensation, calculated as real compensation per employee multiplied by total employment. In 
the national accounts, all income of the self-employed are classified as operating surplus. However, since part of this mixed 
income is a return to the labour of the self-employed, the simple (unadjusted) share of labor compensation in GDP 
underestimates the labour share. Thus the adjusted wage share allocates a labour compensation for each self-employed person 
equivalent to the average compensation of the dependent employees. This methodology is used by the OECD and AMECO 
for calculating adjusted labour share.  
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The fall in the UK or the US seems to be more moderate than in the Eurozone; but this is only 
because the very high top managerial wages, specific to Anglo-Saxon countries, are reported 
in the national accounts as part of labour compensation. In the Anglo-Saxon countries a drastic 
rise in the remuneration of top managers has occurred since the 1980s (Atkinson et al., 2011). 
Managerial wages did not experience the same surge in continental Europe. If we could 
calculate the wage share excluding these top managerial wages, the fall in the UK would look 
more like that in the Eurozone, which is about 11%-point  over the last three decades.  
After the US, the top 1% income share is highest in the UK with 13% as of 2011, as 
can be seen in Figure 2. Prior to the crisis, the top 1% income share had almost reached its 
historical peak levels previously seen before World War I and the Great Depression in the UK 
and the US. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Between 1976 and 2007 in the UK, the income of the top 1% has grown by 3.7% in real terms 
as opposed to almost stagnation – growth of a mere 0.6% - in the real income of the bottom 
99% (TUAC OECD, 2013). The fraction of growth captured by the top 1% has been 24.3% in 
the UK.  
The rise in personal income inequality, in particular top income shares, and the surge 
of the ‘working rich’ as part of it, has attracted most of the mainstream focus. Similarly, there 
is increasing recognition of the concerning growth of the low-wage and precarious workforce 
- the working poor. At the same time as managerial wages were rising, a significant low-wage 
segment emerged in both the UK and the US , as well as in countries like Germany, where top 
income shares did not experience a significant rise. While the developments in the top and 
bottom of the wage distribution are important causes, the silence regarding the middle of the 
 5 
 
wage distribution, and overall the fall in the share of wages at the expense of rising share of 
capital (profits) in national income is remarkable.  
In reality, the rise in personal income inequality is interlinked with the declining share 
of labour income in favour of capital income, i.e. rising functional income inequality, because 
the distribution of capital income is more unequal than that of labour income; hence a decrease 
in the labour share in national income and a rise in capital’s income share makes the economy 
more unequal, and increases personal income inequality as well (Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa, 
2007; Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2011). Evidence shows that the increase in capital’s share 
in national income at the expense of labour income was the main driving force behind the 
increase in personal income inequality (Wolff and Zacharias, 2013). 
The rise in the profit share and top income shares went along with a dramatic rise in wealth 
accumulation at the top as well (Goda, 2014).  The net wealth of the so called high net worth 
individuals6 (HNWIs) increased more than 1.5-fold between 2002 and 2007, from US$26.7 to 
US$41 trillion; the global wealth holdings of billionaires increased even more by 2.3-fold 
(Goda, 2014). Both the HNWI population and the mean wealth per HNWI increased. Personal 
income inequality and wealth concentration self-reinforce each other, because high income 
households save a higher proportion of their income and also income from capital is an 
important part of income at the top of the distribution. 
The redistribution from labour to capital has been so stark that it eventually attracted 
the attention of even the orthodox international institutions in the 2000s with both the IMF and 
the European Commission (EC) publishing reports. The mainstream conclusion, informed by 
neoclassical theory, as most prominently represented by the IMF (2007), the EC (2007) and 
Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) of the OECD, is that technological change is the primary 
determinant of falling wage shares; globalisation is listed as the second most important cause. 
                                                          
6 HNWI are individuals who have a net worth of at least US$1 million (primary residency excluded). 
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The policy translation of these mainstream findings is that the fall in the wage share is 
inevitable as long as we are not against technical change and globalisation; hence nothing can 
be done, other than perhaps skill upgrading. However, the fall in the share of labour and the 
rise in profit share are not limited to unskilled industries; it has happened also in industries 
hiring predominantly skilled labour.7 Moreover, Stockhammer (2013) argued that a close 
examination of the reported findings reveals that the the negative effects of technology were 
not robust in different estimation methods or specifications. Indeed both the IMF (2007) and 
the EC (2007) report that the effect of technological change on labour’s share is not significant 
any more when a time trend8 is included. However, instead of interpreting these non-robust 
effects of technology with caution, they rather make a strong case that the fall in the wage share 
is an outcome of technological progress. Hence, the policy implication of these mainstream 
institutions is that the fall in labour share is predominantly an unavoidable consequence of 
technological change; as long as we are not against technology, we have to accept the rise in 
inequality in favour of capital. On the contrary, the political economy approach (Rodrik, 1997; 
Diwan, 2001; Harrison, 2002; Onaran, 2009; Jayadev, 2007; Rodriguez and Jayadev, 2010; 
ILO, 2011; Kristal, 2010; Stockhammer, 2013) emphasises the negative effects of 
globalisation, financialisation, and the decline in government spending on the bargaining power 
of labour, and hence the wage share. The implication of these political economy findings is 
that the fall in the wage share is an outcome of policy design, and can be reversed by the correct 
policies. These will be discussed in more detail in the final section of the paper. 
 
 
                                                          
7 IMF (2007) attempts to distinguish the effects on the wage share of workers in skilled and unskilled industries; however the 
study claims that the income share of skilled workers rose by focusing on the share of the wage bill in the industries using 
predominantly skilled labour as a ratio to the economy-wide value added, rather than the share of wages in the skilled sectors 
as a ratio to the value added in those sectors, which is also mentioned in a figure in the paper. According to the latter indicator, 
which is reported but not discussed in the IMF study, the labour share of skilled workers is also falling in some major 
economies.   
8 These are called time effects in panel data estimations. 
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3. The effect of falling wage share on growth 
 
An important question is how economies performed during these decades of decline in the 
wage share. Figure 1 above plots both the wage share and growth rates and Table 1 below 
shows in more detail the average growth rates in GDP in different periods in the UK, Eurozone-
12 and the US. The decline in the wage share was associated with a weaker growth performance 
in each decade compared to the previous decade in all cases. In the UK, the seemingly higher 
growth rates of 2000-2007 are an illusionary outcome with hindsight. In the absence of strong 
productivity-oriented wage increases, increasing household debt fuelled consumption; this 
provided a fragile growth model, which collapsed with the Great Recession. Average annual 
growth in the 2000s (2000-13) in the UK, including the years of the Great Recession, was a 
dismal 1.7%. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
What do competing economic theories predict about the effect of a fall in the wage share, hence 
a rise in the profit share on growth? Mainstream economic policy informed by neoclassical 
economics emphasises the supply side rather than the demand side of the economy; and 
assumes that demand will follow supply. Typically, wages are treated merely as a component 
of cost. When the wage share falls, and profit share increases this is expected to lead to a rise 
in private investment due to higher profitability, as well as net exports due to lower unit labour 
costs, and thus higher international competitiveness. This thinking guides policies promoting 
wage moderationin the UK and Europe. E.g. the European Commission (2006) explicitly 
argues that wage moderation, i.e. real wage growth below productivity growth, is the key to 
preserve growth and jobs in a competitive global economy. From this perspective, further 
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deregulation in the labour markets would be seen as a positive development to ensure wage 
moderation.  
However, the facts summarised in Figure 1 and Table 1 clearly pose a puzzle from the 
perspective of these mainstream policies. Why is growth lower in the post-1980s despite a rise 
in the profit share?  
Post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian models address this by integrating the dual role of 
wages both as a cost and a source of demand.9 These models synthesise the ideas of Keynes, 
Kalecki, and Marx, and while they accept the direct positive effects of higher profits on private 
investment and net exports as emphasised in mainstream models, they contrast these positive 
effects with the negative effects on consumption. Demand plays a central role in determining 
growth, and the distribution of income between wages and profits have a crucial effect on 
demand.10 Firstly, consumption is expected to decrease when the wage share decreases, since 
workers consume more as a proportion of their income compared to the owners of capital. In 
technical terms, the marginal propensity to consume out of wage income is higher than that out 
of profit income. Secondly, a higher profitability (a lower wage share) is expected to stimulate 
private investment for a given level of aggregate demand. Thirdly, net exports (exports minus 
imports), for a given level of domestic and foreign demand, will depend negatively on unit 
labour costs, which are by definition, closely related to the wage share. Thus, the total effect 
of the decrease in the wage share on aggregate demand of the private sector (households and 
firms) depends on the relative size of the reactions of consumption, private investment and net 
exports to changes in income distribution. If the total effect is negative, the demand regime is 
called wage-led; otherwise the regime is profit-led.  
                                                          
9 The theoretical models have been formally developed by Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984), Taylor (1985), Blecker (1989), 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). 
10 The distribution of income between wages and profits, i.e. labour and capital, reflects the “functional distribution of income” 
between different classes. The emphasis on personal income distribution in the mainstream debates on inequality, e.g. the share 
of top 1%, neglects the change in the distribution of income between labour and capital. However, the latter has significant 
consequences for demand. Needless to say, this does not mean that the rise in top income shares is unimportant, but the analysis 
of inequality should incorporate the inequality between classes as well.  
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Theoretically, both are likely scenarios, and whether the negative effect of lower wages on 
consumption, or the positive effect on investment and net exports is larger in absolute value, is 
an empirical question depending on the parameters of an economy. If consumption is very 
sensitive to distribution, i.e. if the differences in the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wages and profits is very high; if investment is not very sensitive to profits, but responds more 
to demand; if domestic demand constitutes a more significant part of aggregate demand; and if 
net exports are not very responsive to relative prices and the effect of labour costs on export 
prices are not very large, then the economy is more likely to be wage-led. If the responsiveness 
of investment to profits is rather strong and foreign trade is an important part of the economy 
(as is the case in small open economies) and is very responsive to labour costs, then the 
economy is more likely to be profit-led. In a wage-led economy, a fall in the labour share would 
generate a decline in GDP; for growth a higher wage share is required. Pro-capital policies 
would generate more growth only if an economy is profit-led.    
While Post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian models offer a general theory, which allows for 
different regimes and opposing effects of the wage share on growth, mainstream economic 
policy assumes that all economies are profit-led. Indeed the mainstream argument goes beyond 
that since the EC’s policy of wage moderation is prescribed to all the countries in Europe; 
hence the EC implicitly assumes that Europe as a whole is profit-led. Similarly, these policies 
have been exported to the developing world through the IMF and the World Bank; hence the 
implicit assumption must be that the global economy is profit-led.  
 
4. Empirical evidence for wage-led growth 
 
A wide body of empirical research in the tradition of Post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian models 
challenge the assumption that all countries are profit-led (e.g. Onaran and Galanis, 2012; 
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Onaran et al 2011; Stockhammer et al 2009; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 
2007; Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004; Bowles and Boyer, 1995).  
This section first summarises our most recent estimation results regarding the effects of 
the changes in the wage share on growth based on Onaran and Galanis (2012), for the UK as 
well as other major developed and developing G20 countries. These countries constitute more 
than 80% of global GDP. In this work, we also go beyond the nation state as the unit of analysis 
and discuss the global effects based on the responses of each country to changes, not only in 
domestic income distribution, but also to trade partners’ wage share. This is because a change 
in the wage share in a trade partner affects the import prices and foreign demand for each 
country. This global interaction is crucial, since neoliberal and pro-capital redistribution 
policies have been implemented almost simultaneously in many developed and developing 
countries in the post-1980s period,. Thus we have experienced a global race to the bottom in 
the wage share.   
This empirical analysis is based on econometric estimations of consumption, 
investment, exports, and imports. Consumption is estimated as a function of adjusted profits, 
and adjusted wages. Our empirical findings verify that the marginal propensity to consume out 
of profits is lower than that out of wages in all countries; thus a rise in the profit share leads to 
a decline in consumption. Private investment is estimated as a function of output and the profit 
share. To estimate the effects of distribution on net exports we follow a stepwise approach: 
Exports are estimated as a function of export/import prices, and the GDP of the rest of the 
world; imports as a function of domestic prices/import prices, and GDP; domestic prices and 
export prices, are estimated as functions of nominal unit labour costs and import prices. The 
total effect of a change in wage share on exports is the effect of nominal unit labour costs on 
prices, the effect of prices on export prices, and the effect of export prices on exports. The 
effect of the wage share on GDP via the channel of international trade not only depends on the 
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sensitivity of exports and imports to prices, but it also depends on the degree of openness of 
the economy (i.e., on the share of exports and imports in GDP); thus in relatively small open 
economies net exports may play a major role in determining the overall outcome; the effect 
becomes much lower in relatively closed large economies. 
Table 2 summarises the effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share on 
consumption, investment, and net exports based on the estimations by Onaran and Galanis 
(2012).  
[Table 2] 
 
One finding stands out as a robust result for all countries. When the profit share increases, this 
leads a much more substantial fall in domestic consumption compared to the rise in private 
investment. Ignoring exports and imports for a second, looking at only on the effects on 
domestic demand, i.e. the effects on consumption and investment (in columns A and B), the 
negative effect of the increase in the profit share on private consumption is substantially larger 
than the positive effect on private investment in absolute value in all countries. This means that 
demand in the domestic sector of economies, leaving the foreign demand aside, is clearly wage-
led.11 Hence, domestic demand unambiguously contracts when the wage share falls and profit 
share increases. However, the effects on net exports in Column C then have a crucial role in 
determining whether the economy is profit-led. Column D reports the total effect on private 
demand. Column E shows the total effects after the multiplier process: The initial change in 
private demand due to a change in income distribution leads to a multiplier mechanism, which 
affects consumption, investment, and imports. This magnifies the effects of a change in income 
                                                          
11 Consistent with our findings, previous findings for the individual countries in the literature also mostly conclude that 
domestic demand is wage-led. See Stockhammer et al (2009) for the Euro area; Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011) for Germany, 
France, US, Japan, Canada, Australia; Naastepad and Storm (2007) for Germany, France, Italy, UK; Hein and Vogel (2008) 
for Germany, France, UK, US; Bowles and Boyer (1995) for Germany, France, UK, US, Japan; Stockhammer et al (2011) for 
Germany, and Ederer and Stockhammer (2007) for France. 
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distribution on aggregate demand further. If the sign of the total effect in columns D and E are 
negative, then the economy is wage-led; thus a rise in the profit share leads to a negative effect 
on growth.   
The results for the UK indicate that it is a wage-led economy.12 A 1%-point increase in 
the profit share leads to a 0.03% decrease in private demand after the multiplier effects (see 
Column E). This is due to a decline in the share of consumption by 0.30%-point as a ratio to 
GDP, which cannot be offset by a modest rise in investment by only 0.12%-point and in net 
exports by 0.16%-point as ratios to GDP.  
Demand in the Eurozone-12 is also significantly wage-led; a 1%-point increase in the 
profit share leads to a 0.13% decrease in private demand. Unsurprisingly, Germany, France, 
and Italy as individual large members of the Eurozone-12 area are also wage-led. The absolute 
value of the effect of an increase in the profit share on demand in the individual countries like 
Germany and France is smaller than in the Euro area as a whole, because the net export effects 
are higher for the individual countries, which have a much higher export and import share in 
GDP due to trade with the other European countries as well as non-European countries, 
whereas the Euro area as a whole is a rather closed economy with low extra-EU trade albeit a 
high intra-EU trade. Previous studies show that small open economies in the Euro area, like 
the Netherlands and Austria, may be profit-led, when analysed in isolation (Hein and Vogel 
2008; Stockhammer and Ederer, 2008). . A similar argument would apply to the rest of the EU 
as well. Thus wage moderation, which keeps real wage growth below productivity, and leads 
to a fall in the wage share in Europe as a whole is likely to have only moderate effects on 
foreign trade, but it will have substantial effects on domestic demand. Second, if wages were 
to change simultaneously in all the EU countries, the net export position of each country would 
change little because extra-EU trade is comparatively small. Thus, when all EU countries 
                                                          
12 Hein and Vogel (2008), Naastepad and Storm (2007), and Bowles and Boyer (1995) are the other studies who have tested 
similar models for the UK, and they all have found that the UK is a wage-led economy. 
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pursue “beggar thy neighbour” policies, the international competitiveness effects will be minor, 
and the domestic effects will dominate the outcome.   
The US, Japan, and in the developing world, Turkey and Korea, are also wage-led. 
Overall, the results indicate that large, relatively closed economies are more likely to be wage-
led. Canada and Australia in the developed world, and China, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, 
and India are profit-led; as small open economies with a high share of exports and imports in 
national income, the net export effects are higher in all of these countries.  
  So far, these are only the national effects in isolation, i.e. assuming that the change is 
taking place only in one single country. The last column of Table 2 summarises the total effects 
when there is a global race to the bottom - a simultaneous 1% decrease in the wage share in all 
of these large developed and developing countries which constitutes 80% of world GDP.   
Comparing columns E and F, the contraction in the UK, as well as other wage-led 
countries (Eurozone-12, US, Japan, Turkey, and Korea) is now much higher. In this global race 
to the bottom scenario, a 1%-point simultaneous decrease in the wage share leads to a decline 
in UK GDP by 0.21%-point; the effect is now economically a lot more important. In this case, 
the Eurozone-12 contracts by 0.25%-point.   
The profit-led economies of Canada, Mexico, Argentina, and India also start 
contracting when the effects of decreasing import prices and changes in the GDP of the trade 
partners on net exports are incorporated in a simultaneous race to the bottom scenario. These 
countries could grow when they experienced a fall in the wage-share alone, but when the wage 
share falls in all their trade partners, this expansionary effect of a fall in the wage share is 
reversed, as relative competitiveness effects are reduced and global demand contracts, when 
all countries are implementing a similar wage competition strategy.     
Most interestingly, overall, a 1%-point simultaneous decline in the wage share in the 
world leads to a decline in the global GDP by 0.36%-points (the average of the growth rates in 
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column F of Table 2 weighted by the share of each country in the world GDP). Thus the world 
economy in aggregate is wage-led; if there is a simultaneous decline in the wage share in all 
countries (or as in our case in the thirteen major economies of the world), aggregate demand in 
the world economy also decreases. To reformulate the results positively, a 1%-point 
simultaneous increase in the wage share at the global level could lead to 0.36%-point higher 
rate of growth in the global GDP. In this scenario, the UK economy would grow by 0.21%-
point. 
Finally we simulate the effects of an alternative scenario of a simultaneous wage-led 
recovery in these thirteen large economies as opposed to a race to the bottom. It is possible to 
find a scenario, where all countries can grow along with an improvement in the wage share; 
e.g. if all wage-led countries return to their previous peak wage-share levels, and moreover, if 
all originally profit-led countries increases their wage-share by 1-3%-point, all countries could 
grow, and the global GDP would increase by 3.05% (Onaran and Galanis, 2012). As part of 
this global high road scenario, a 7.8% point increase in the wage share in the UK leads to a 
1.9% growth in UK GDP.  
To summarise, firstly, domestic private demand (the sum of consumption and 
investment) is wage-led in all countries, because consumption is much more sensitive to an 
increase in the profit share than investment is. Tthus an economy is profit-led only when the 
effect of distribution on net exports is high enough to offset the effects on domestic demand. 
Secondly, foreign trade forms only a small part of aggregate demand in large countries, like 
the UK, and therefore the positive effects of a decline in the wage share on net exports do not 
suffice to offset the negative effects on domestic demand. Similarly, if countries, which have 
strong trade relations with each other (like the EU), are considered as an aggregate economic 
area, the private demand regime is wage-led. Thirdly, even if there are some countries, which 
are profit-led, the global economy as a whole is wage-led because the world is a closed 
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economy. Mainstream strategies that impose the same wage moderation policies in all 
countries, assume that the world as a whole, as well as the majority of countries, are profit-led. 
This is against the logic of our findings, given that the effects of a fall in the wage share on 
domestic consumption more than offsets the effects on investment; if there is no trade, then a 
closed economy cannot be profit-led. 
The micro rationale of an individual firm cannot be generalised to the macro rationale 
of a country. Individual firms might prefer to suppress the wages of its own workers to increase 
profits (ignoring the effects of this on productivity and morale), but they would prefer all other 
firms to give a pay rise such that there is someone to buy their goods. Even though a higher 
profit share at the firm level seems to be beneficial to individual capitalists, at the 
macroeconomic level a generalised fall in the wage share generates a problem of realisation of 
profits due to deficient demand in a wage-led economy. Furthermore, even in profit-led 
countries, a global fall in the wage share leads to a global aggregate demand deficiency, and 
potentially contraction in the individual profit-led country as well. A seemingly rational pro-
profit strategy at the level of an individual firm or a country is irrational and contractionary at 
the macro or global level.   
 
5. Policy implications for the UK’s wage-led economy 
 
Empirical evidence provides support for alternative policies for wage-led development. At the 
national level, in a country like the UK, where the parameters of the economy suggest that the 
growth regime is wage-led, pro-profit redistributive policies are detrimental to growth. In 
wage-led economies, more egalitarian policies are consistent with growth. Even if we make a 
very cautious interpretation of the empirical findings, it is clear that there is room for policies 
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to decrease income inequality without hurting the growth potential in a wage-led economy like 
the UK.     
Evidence also shows that large countries or large economic areas like the EU, which 
have high intra-regional trade and low extra-regional trade, are more likely to be wage-led. 
This implies that in the EU, macroeconomic policy coordination, in particular with regards to 
a wage policy, with an aim to reverse the fall in the wage share over recent decades, can 
improve growth and employment. The current wage moderation policy of the European 
Commission impedes growth.  
Economic conservatives and neoliberals often assert that in a highly competitive global 
environment, wages cannot be increased. However, there is strong empirical evidence to reject 
this myth that a single country cannot have pro-labour policies in a globalised economy. 
Globalisation is not an isolated phenomenon; and it is not only an economic process, but also 
a process of political contagion. Wage moderation policies have been imposed on all countries 
as a means of competition based on labour costs. Neoliberal national governments across the 
world used globalisation as an excuse to implement policies that led to a drastic fall in the wage 
share, while International Financial Institutions such as the IMF have imposed policies such as 
labour market deregulation in its structural adjustment programmes as a conditionality for 
credit support in the developing countries. The policies of the Troika in the periphery of Europe 
is a recent example of this imposition. There is a coordination of neoliberal policies that leads 
to the diffusion of policies that promote international competition based on wage moderation. 
However, contrary to the common wisdom, our results show that neoliberal globalisation, 
which has led to a global race to the bottom in the wage share amplifies the negative effects of 
wage moderation as international competitiveness effects of lower wages cancel each other out 
across the countries . When policies that lead to a decrease in the wage share are implemented 
in all countries, their effects on net exports become irrelevant, as relative prices of exports and 
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imports do not change much. As a consequence, each individual country is left with only the 
negative effects of a fall in the wage share on domestic consumption.  
The low-wage reserve army of labour in the developing world is not the main cause of 
labour losing ground to capital at home in the UK or Europe. Indeed the developed countries 
have been the leader of  anti-labour wage moderation policies; and used globalisation as a pre-
text to implement them and to claim that there is no alternative. Furthermore, international 
financial institutions served to implement them in developing countries as part of austerity and 
structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s. However, evidence shows that the developed 
world has to do the just the opposite: start with pro-labour policies to improve the wage share 
unilaterally at home and export these good policies to the rest of the world. According to our 
findings, the UK and the EU as a whole would be the economies that would benefit most from 
a coordinated boost to the wage share at the global level. As the main beneficiaries of a global 
wage-led recovery, the UK and Europe could, and should, take a step forward in terms of 
radically reversing the fall in the wage share first at home. This would create space for levelling 
the global playground through international labour standards and domestic demand-led and 
egalitarian growth strategies. Even the individual profit-led countries can grow if there is a 
simultaneous increase in the wage share. Indeed, in the majority of profit-led countries, it is 
not at all possible to grow with policies that result in a decline in the wage share, when this 
strategy is implemented in many other large economies at the same time. If we want developing 
countries like China to rebalance their economies towards domestic demand as opposed to 
mere reliance on export orientation based on low wages, we should start at home. The wage 
moderation policy of the UK and Europe is the ultimate impediment to wage-led development 
in the Global South as well. Current mainstream policies that place an excessive emphasis on 
international competitiveness based on wage competition are counter-productive in a highly 
integrated global economy. In contrast, a wage-led recovery offers a solution to correct global 
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imbalances via coordinated macroeconomic and wage policy, where domestic demand plays 
an important role.   
Finally, a common worry, also among progressive policymakers is the following 
question: if the rest of Europe or the world does not reverse their low road policies, can the UK 
implement pro-labour policies unilaterally? Yes, because the UK is a wage-led economy, even 
after considering the negative effects of a rise in the wage share on international trade. Starting 
from today’s level of low wage share, if our trade partners do nothing to increase wages in their 
own countries, and if it is only the UK that introduces pro-labour policies that lead to a 1%-
point annual increase in the wage share, the UK could still achieve an annual growth rate in 
GDP, which would be 0.03%-point higher than if nothing was done. The effect of a moderate 
increase in the wage share on growth is not very high, but it is positive; hence a rise in the wage 
share does not lead to a recession. Would that not increase the trade deficit problem further? 
Not significantly; the effect of a rise in the wage share on the trade deficit is minor; we estimate 
that a 1%-point increase in the wage share increases the trade deficit as a ratio to GDP by only 
0.16%-point. Furthermore trade imbalance is a structural problem, and it has to be tackled 
accordingly through industrial policy rather than being posed as a barrier to egalitarian policies. 
Finally, what if our trade partners continue their aggressive wage competition policies via 
further decreases in the wage share, while they free ride on the rise in the wage share and 
growth in the UK? The answer is that there would be still an area of manoeuvre left in a wage-
led economy like the UK, even in the presence of ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies elsewhere; 
however we do not deny the fact that this area of manoeuvre will be significantly narrower in 
the case of a continued race to the bottom, and if good pro-labour policies cannot be extended 
to the rest of Europe, protectionist measures against social dumping should be secured. 
Conversely, the effects of the pro-labour policies would be a lot stronger if implemented at the 
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European level; therefore we should see Europe as a chance to increase our area of manoeuvre, 
and use every chance to improve cooperation among pro-labour forces.   
Policies to push for a wage-led development strategy can be, and should be, 
implemented for not only equality but also economic and political stability: rising income 
inequality has been one of the root causes of the Great Recession (Goda et al, 2014). How did 
the global economy or the UK manage to grow along with declining wage shares until the Great 
Recession? A decline in the wage share has led to a potential deficiency in aggregate demand; 
the outcome should have been a stagnation of demand and growth according to our results. 
This was mainly circumvented by two growth models: in the UK, the US, or the periphery of 
Europe, households increased their debt to maintain consumption levels in the absence of 
decent wage increases. Financial deregulation and housing bubbles made this possible. The 
second growth model has been the export-led case of countries like Germany or Japan. As 
domestic demand stagnated along with falling wage share in these countries, they maintained 
their growth thanks to exports to countries with a debt-led growth model. The debt in the latter 
model was financed with capital flows from the export-led countries. The current account 
surpluses in the export-led countries are the mirror image of the current account deficits of the 
debt-led countries. Both are equally unsustainable as they could only co-exist with debt and 
global imbalances. The Great Recession has proven the fragility of this model. Lessons have 
been ignored by those who benefit from inequality. The recovery in Britain is built once again 
on the shaky ground of household debt instead of wage growth.  
Reversing inequality would not only bring us a step closer to eliminating a root cause 
of the crisis, but it would also be a way of making the responsible pay for the crisis.    
How can we achieve wage-led development? Has the fall in the wage share not been an 
inevitable consequence of the so-called skilled bias technological change or globalisation as 
the mainstream tells us? No, as we have discussed in Section 3, the fall in the wage share has 
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been a deliberate outcome of policies that led to the fall in the bargaining power of labour, 
welfare state retrenchment, and financialisation. The solution therefore lies in reversing this 
process. 
Policies should be in place to ensure that nominal wages increase in line with inflation 
and productivity. This should follow an initial gradual correction of the loss in the wage share 
over the past three decades. Productivity orientation, however, should reflect what is relevant 
and valuable for the job, rather than a blind emphasis on output per worker or hour. In particular 
in services, e.g. in care jobs, a high quality delivery of the service requires a lower output per 
hour rather than a high one; wage norms should reflect meaningful measures of performance 
and quality.   
A strategy of wage-led development requires a policy mix that includes labour market 
policies aimed at pre-distribution, i.e. the determination of wages as market outcomes, as well 
as redistributive policies through progressive taxes. Furthermore, distribution policies need to 
be complemented by a macroeconomic and industrial policy mix. Wage policies have to be 
embedded into broader targets of equality, full employment, and ecological sustainability. This 
is why this paper discusses a strategy for wage-led development rather than simply a strategy 
for growth.   
 
5.1 Pre-distributive labour market policies  
A wage-led development strategy requires policies targeting the top, middle, and bottom of the 
wage distribution. Mainstream interest in inequality has focused excessively on the bottom, 
and only more recently on the top of the income distribution, while the middle is either ignored, 
or is seen as an impediment to improvements in the bottom due to the so-called powerful 
workers organised in the unions. However, the wage share of workers in the middle of the 
income distribution has also been squeezed by rising profits and managerial salaries.  
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Strengthening the bargaining power of labour 
 
An improvement in the wage share has to include a rise in the wages of the middle, which in 
turn requires re-regulating the labour market, and strengthening the bargaining power of labour 
via an improvement in union legislation, and widening the coverage of collective bargaining.  
A government dedicated to strengthening collective bargaining as a policy objective 
can make a big difference. Ewing and Hendy (2013) remind us how the UK was the pioneer in 
the world in the development of collective bargaining during 1917-1921 and in the aftermath 
of the Great Depression after 1934. Sadly the UK has also led the attack on collective 
bargaining in the post-1980s. Their work highlights the importance of the state in institution 
building to facilitate sectoral bargaining structures, and the key role played by the Ministry of 
Labour, which was established in 1916. In its early days, sectoral collective bargaining also 
received the interest of employers, who regarded it as a means of avoiding undercutting by 
competitors. Collective bargaining coverage was as high as 70% in 1950, and increased to 82% 
in 1979; yet is now below 25%. The UK was the only country in the EU with collective 
bargaining coverage below 50% until recently (Ewing and Hendy, 2013).       
Beyond sectoral bargaining structures, improving wage coordination at the national 
level is crucial for reducing wage inequality. Highly structured industrial relations at the 
national level lead to lower inequality among wage earners. Earnings dispersion is lower the 
higher the union density, bargaining coverage and the degree of centralisation or coordination 
(OECD, 2004). Even the World Bank (2013) in its recent World Development Report admits 
that the potential negative impacts of collective bargaining and minimum wages on 
employment and other labour market outcomes have been over-stated in the past. 
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Improving minimum and living wages 
 
Regarding the bottom of the wage distribution, the key priority is establishing a sufficiently 
high statutory minimum wage to address the growth of in-work poverty. Evidence shows that 
robust minimum wages can reduce inequality (ILO, 2012). A rise in minimum wages not only 
reduces reliance on benefits, but also improves demand and growth in a wage-led economy. 
Low-income earners would spend a higher proportion of their income, and this would lead to 
a further increase in growth and employment through the multiplier effects. In the US, the myth 
about the negative effects of minimum wages on youth employment was discredited after 
research by Card and Krueger (1994) showed that in the fast food industry, a major employer 
of young workers, minimum wages indeed increased, not decreased, youth employment. In an 
extensive meta-analysis of the studies on the effects of minimum wages in the US, 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2008) show that there is little or no evidence of a negative 
association between minimum wages and employment. Butcher et al. (2012) showed that 
minimum wages in the UK decreased inequality, but had no significant negative effects on 
employment. Furthermore research shows that a higher minimum wage reduces turnover 
among workers, and creates employment stability for low-wage workers (Dube et al., 2011), 
which in turn helps firms to increase their productivity (Pollin et al., 2008). The Greater London 
Authority reports that 80% of employers believe that the living wage has enhanced the quality 
of work (Lansley and Reed, 2013). Raising the minimum wage can also increase labour force 
participation rates, as paid employment becomes attractive, and reduce spending on 
unemployment benefits by the state. Lansley and Reed (2013) argue that the government gets 
back about 45% of any increase in low pay rates through reduction in public spending on tax 
credit and benefits as well as increased tax revenues. 
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How high should the minimum wage be? The reference point has to be a living wage. A living 
wage is defined as a wage that gives workers the ability “to maintain self respect and to have 
both the means and the leisure to participate in the civic life of the nation” (Glickman, 1997). 
Currently in the UK, the legal minimum wage is well below the living wage as calculated by 
various bodies. Pollin (2007) discusses the experience of Santa Fe in the US, and suggests a 
strategy of making the minimum wage a living wage through gradual increases. After each step 
of increase, employment effects can be assessed before proceeding with further increases. Once 
the living wage level has been attained, increases beyond this could then be tied both to 
inflation and average labour productivity (Pollin, 2007). In the transition period of gradual 
adjustments to the minimum wage, living wage rates should be used within public sector 
organisations, and should be imposed on private firms working as contractors or suppliers to 
the public sector. Even after the convergence of the national minimum wage to a living wage, 
local authorities can set their own living wage norms at levels higher than the national 
minimum wage as local costs of living differ. 
 
Enforcing pay ratios 
 
Finally, for a wage-led recovery, the higher end of the wage distribution must be regulated as 
well. This would increase the area of maneuver to increase wages at the bottom and the middle, 
while offsetting the squeeze on profits by cutting high managerial wages. The recent crisis has 
made it clearer that top executive pay has been fundamentally unrelated to firm performance 
in the financial industry, but the problems with top pay is not limited to banks but is in fact 
widespread among large companies in the private sector. Hutton (2011) reports that pay ratios 
in the public sector are mostly within a 20:1 band, whereas according to a report by One Society 
(2011), the ratio is at 262:1 among FTSE 100 companies. Corporate governance reforms should 
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aim at curtailing top managerial compensation via limiting the ratio of top pay to median 
incomes in the private sector. Lansley and Reed (2013) report a variety of examples where 
private firms or cooperatives voluntarily implemented top-to-bottom ratios between 6:1 to 
19:1. France has imposed a maximum of 20:1 pay ratio in public sector firms in 2012, which 
has put a downward pressure on executive pay in some major private companies as well 
(Lansley and Reed, 2013). In 2013 in a referendum in Switzerland, 35% of the voters voted for 
legally capping the top-to-bottom pay ratio in all firms at 12:1. 
 
5.2 Redistributive policies 
Labour market policies need to be complemented by redistributive policies to tame the power 
of capital. Wage-led development requires redistribution from capital to labour and from the 
top 1% towards the 99%, in particular towards the bottom 50%.  This requires a rise in 
corporate tax rates as well as top marginal income tax rates.  
 
Progressive taxation 
 
We need to restore the progressivity of the tax system. Recent history shows that higher top 
marginal tax rates discourage excessive managerial pay. Progressive income tax could be used 
to impose a maximum income, with the highest marginal tax rate increasing to 90-95% above 
a threshold corresponding to the top 1% of incomes. Indeed, this rate is not radical compared 
to the top tax rates in the UK before the 1980s: between 1974 and 1979 the top income tax rate 
in the UK was 83% on incomes above approximately £91,000 in today’s prices (£24,000 at 
1979’s). Indeed, with additional taxes of 15% on unearned income such as dividends and 
interest on investments, the top rate was as high as 98% in 1979. High top marginal tax rates 
need to be combined with policies regulating bonuses in the form of stock options and top pay. 
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Progressive taxation should also include taxes on wealth such as real estate, cash, deposits, 
shares and bonds. This would permanently narrow the inequality in wealth distribution, and 
prevent a high concentration of wealth.  
One possibility would be to link top income and wealth taxes to median incomes and 
median wealth holdings (Goda et al. 2014), e.g. a top marginal tax rate of 70% for income 
above 10 times the median income, a top marginal tax rate of 10% on all personal net wealth 
(excluding primary residence) that is above 100 times the median wealth, and of 90% for all 
inheritances that are above 100 times the median wealth.   
In the meantime, tougher regulations, preferably at the EU or global level should make 
sure to prevent tax avoidance and evasion. 
 
5.3 Egalitarian development through a macroeconomic and industrial policy mix 
The policies that have changed the balance of power relations in favour of capital have been 
among the core causes of the fall in the wage share and go well beyond labour market policies. 
Therefore any strategy to reverse this has to include policies to rebalance power relations 
through taming the power of capital.  
This strategy should firstly aim at reversing the welfare state retrenchment of the 
previous decades. Government spending on public goods such as education, health, pensions, 
and social security are part of the social wage. The dramatic marketisation of the supply of 
these public goods has narrowed the fall-back options of labour, and eroded its bargaining 
power. Restoring and strengthening the welfare state will significantly improve labour market 
outcomes for wage bargaining.   
A related issue about public spending is public sector wage setting. Public sector wage 
setting has a strong signal effect on the wage bargaining process in the private sector. The 
severe austerity policies since 2010 have been not only about shrinking the state and slashing 
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welfare spending, but have also been an agenda for eroding the power of labour unions in the 
public sector, and imposing pay freezes on public sector workers. There is a cross-party 
consensus in the UK regarding public sector wage freezes under the pretext of defending jobs. 
However, the dilemma of pay versus jobs is not empirically validated for the UK as a wage-
led economy. Austerity policies with further detrimental effects on the wage shares will only 
bring further stagnation.  
Financialisation has been the other important macroeconomic factor that has caused a 
massive shift in power relations in favour of capital. The increased role of financial activity 
and financial institutions in determining corporate strategies and economic outcomes since the 
1980s has had significant effects on the bargaining position of labour (Hein and van Treeck, 
2010; Hein and Mundt, 2012; Stockhammer, 2013). Non-financial firms have increased their 
fall-back options in terms of the choice between geographic locations as well as investing in 
financial versus real assets. It has also led to the orientation towards shareholder value, and 
hence prioritised shareholders’ demands over workers. The same process often had effects on 
the public spending and taxation decisions of governments, which in turn has contributed to 
the erosion of the bargaining power of labour. Hence, reregulating finance, and reversing 
financialisation is an indispensable element of a wage-led development strategy.  
Finally, the neoliberal shift in macroeconomic policy away from a broad focus on full 
employment to a narrow focus on inflation targeting and tight fiscal and monetary policy in the 
post-1980s has been detrimental for growth, as well as labour’s bargaining power and equality. 
Reorienting macroeconomic policies towards full employment is important for not just 
rebalancing power relations but also for rebalancing the economy.  
It is also crucial that policies for wage-led development are complemented by a broad 
mix of economic policy, because the effects that can come from a wage-led recovery on growth 
and hence employment are modest, albeit positive, in magnitude. Wage-led growth is not a 
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magic bullet to solve all the ills of our current economic model. For sustainable and egalitarian 
development, we need to mobilise all of the tools of economic policy and public spending with 
an aim to achieve full employment, ecological sustainability, and equality. Investment and 
industrial policy lie at the core of such an economic policy mix. New investments are the most 
important locomotive of growth and increases in productivity. As such, it is also an important 
guarantee for productivity-oriented wage increases. As already mentioned above, investment 
and industrial policy is also the tool to offset and change the effects of wage increases on trade 
deficits in two ways: Firstly, investment can decrease the import dependency of the economy. 
Secondly, in the long run it can change the composition of exports, and shift exports towards 
innovative products, where demand is less sensitive to prices, thereby the effect of labour costs 
on exports are more modest.   
The weakening of productive investment has been detrimental for job creation. Among 
developed countries, the UK has one of the lowest private investment to GDP ratios. Private 
sector investment has grown at a significantly slower pace than GDP, and this has curbed job 
creation (IILS/ILO, 2011). This has been related to financialisation and the short-termism 
orientated towards the maximisation of dividends to shareholders along with managerial 
bonuses. A pro-labour and pro-jobs strategy needs to break this orientation and put private 
investments in line with profits, as well as stimulating investments via higher demand, and 
industrial policies. But most of all, an investment programme has to rely on public investment, 
in two areas in particular: ecological investments and social infrastructure.    
First, public investment, in green industries like renewable energy, public transport, and 
housing would not only make up for the missing investment, but will also help to meet 
emissions targets to address the ecological crisis. Ecological sustainability requires a shift in 
the composition of aggregate demand towards long-term green investments; this cannot be 
achieved without new strategic tasks for active public investment.   
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Second, public investment should fill in the big gap in social infrastructure; i.e. in health, 
education, childcare, and elderly care, which cannot be provided adequately by private 
investment based on profit motive. The need for social services is not met under the present 
circumstances, where they are provided either at very low wages (to ensure an adequate profit), 
or as a luxury service for the rich, or via invisible unpaid female labour within the gendered 
division of labour in the private sphere. To avoid this deficit they can be provided by the state 
or by non-profit/community organisations. Public investment and spending in social 
infrastructure would generate public employment in labour-intensive social services, and be a 
vehicle for generating full employment with lower rates of growth, a target more consistent 
with low carbon emissions. This could also hit another target of increasing female labour force 
participation rates via socialising the invisible and unpaid care work done by women. 
Ilkkaracan (2013) calls these purple jobs. However, these jobs need to be made attractive for 
all by improving pay and working conditions in these industries. Thus a new orientation 
towards high-skilled, decent service-sector jobs should be promoted instead of the current 
reliance on low-pay service jobs with weaker labour unions. These policies put gender equality 
in pay and employment at the heart of a wage-led development strategy.  
Last but not least, a key policy measure to maintain full employment and a more equal 
income distribution is a substantial shortening of working time in parallel with the historical 
growth in productivity. Reduction in weekly working hours should take place without loss of 
wages, in particular, in the case of low and median wage earners, which implies an increase in 
hourly wages as well as the wage share. This is not an unrealistic target. Compared to the 19th 
Century, we are all working part-time today. But the shortening of working hours has slowed 
down since the 1980s, with the notable exception of France (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2001). More 
equal countries have shorter working hours (Schor, 2010). The shortening of hours over 
previous decades has also been associated with higher hourly productivity (Bosch and 
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Lehndorff, 2001). Shorter working hours not only create more growth but also increase the job 
creation potential of a given rate of growth. The UK and the US have much longer hours than 
Germany and the Netherlands (Schor, 2010). This means that an employer in the UK needs 
more demand than a German employer to create an additional job. This is again a way of 
combining full employment and low carbon emission targets.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
There is strong empirical evidence in the UK as well as many other countries in Europe and 
the world, a fall in the wage share leads to lower growth; hence growth is wage-led and not 
profit-led. In a wage-led country like the UK, or the EU as a whole, more egalitarian policies 
are consistent with growth. Globalisation is not in itself an impediment to a wage-led 
development strategy, as long as the neoliberal policies that have determined the process of 
globalisation since the 1980s can be replaced by policy coordination to bring wages in line with 
productivity increases. The need for coordination does not exclude the possibility to implement 
pro-labour policies in a single country like the UK. However, the impact of these policies on 
growth and employment are stronger when they are coordinated across countries. This calls for 
the UK and Europe plays a leading role in coordinating policies both at the European and global 
level to reverse the fall in the wage share.   
Policies aiming at reversing the fall in the wage share and the rise in inequality are 
particularly important for an economically and politically sustainable recovery after the Great 
Recession. A strategy of wage-led development requires a mix of policies aiming at pre-
distribution and redistribution as well as macroeconomic policies and industrial policy for full 
employment and ecological sustainability.   
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None of the policies that have been discussed above are unknown to policy makers. History of 
the UK as well as other developed and developing countries provide examples on how they 
can be implemented. The tools for a wage-led development strategy are available. Their 
implementation is a question of optimism of the will and political change.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Wage share (adjusted, ratio to GDP at factor cost, %) and growth in GDP (%), 1960-
2013 
a. The UK 
 
b. Eurozone-12 original member states 
 
c. The US 
 
 
Source: Ameco. 
Note: Adjusted wage share is labour compensation per employee multiplied by the number of employed people 
as percentage of GDP at factor cost. 
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Figure 2 Income share of the top 1% of the income distribution in the US, UK, 
France and Germany 
 
Source: World Top Incomes Database http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes Note: There is a 
break in the UK series in 1990. 
 
 
Table 1 Average growth of GDP (%) 
 
          
1961-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2007 2008-2013
United Kingdom 2.90 2.42 2.48 2.18 3.17 -0.28
Euro area (12 countries) 5.29 3.78 2.27 2.12 2.16 -0.28
United States 4.69 3.24 3.14 3.25 2.65 0.93  
 
        
          
Source: Ameco. 
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Table 2. The summary of the effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share (1%-point decrease in the wage share) 
 
 
The effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share in only one country on 
 
 
The effect of a 
simultaneous 1%-
point increase on % 
change in aggregate 
demand    
C/Y I/Y NX/Y private excess demand/Y 
% change in aggregate 
demand (D*multiplier) 
 
A B C D (A+B+C) E F 
Euro area-12 -0.439 0.299 0.057 -0.084 -0.133 -0.245 
Germany -0.501 0.376 0.096 -0.029 -0.031 - 
France -0.305 0.088 0.198 -0.020 -0.027 - 
Italy -0.356 0.130 0.126 -0.100 -0.173 - 
United 
Kingdom -0.303 0.120 0.158 -0.025 -0.030 -0.214 
United States -0.426 0.000 0.037 -0.388 -0.808 -0.921 
Japan -0.353 0.284 0.055 -0.014 -0.034 -0.179 
Canada -0.326 0.182 0.266 0.122 0.148 -0.269 
Australia -0.256 0.174 0.272 0.190 0.268 0.172 
Turkey -0.491 0.000 0.283 -0.208 -0.459 -0.717 
Mexico -0.438 0.153 0.381 0.096 0.106 -0.111 
Korea -0.422 0.000 0.359 -0.063 -0.115 -0.864 
Argentina -0.153 0.015 0.192 0.054 0.075 -0.103 
China -0.412 0.000 1.986 1.574 1.932 1.115 
India -0.291 0.000 0.310 0.018 0.040 -0.027 
South Africa -0.145 0.129 0.506 0.490 0.729 0.390 
 
Source: Onaran and Galanis (2013),  “Is aggregate demand wage-led or profit-led? a global model”, in Wage-led Growth. An Equitable Strategy for Economic Recovery, eds. 
Lavoie and Stockhammer, Palgrave, 2013  
Note: C: Consumption, I: private Investment, NX, net exports, Y: GDP. The global simulation excludes Germany, France and Italy since they are part of the Eurozone 
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